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EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT MISCONDUCT UPON 
A LAWFUL ARREST 
I 
Assuming that the actor has made a proper and valid arrest, what 
effect has a subsequent dereliction of duty or misconduct on the part 
of the actor towards the prisoner ?1 The question may arise in several 
ways.2 
1. If the arrest is made under process, the actor may fail to return 
the process, or may make a defective return. 
2. Following an arrest either with or without process, the actor 
may fail to use reasonable diligence to bring his prisoner promptly be-
fore a proper court or magistrate. 
3. Or the actor may release, or permit the release of, the prisoner 
without presentment before a proper court or magistrate. 
4. Or the actor may misuse his official power over the prisoner in 
order to coerce him to comply with some demand which has no relation 
to the purpose of presentment before a proper cburt in the due course of 
administration of the criminal law, as for example, to compel the 
prisoner to restore property, or to pay money, or, perhaps, to disclose 
evidence against himself or others. 
5. Or the actor may use unnecessary or unreasonable force against 
the prisoner in maintaining his custody, or he may take advantage of his 
power in order to inflict bodily harm on the prisoner or to commit some 
other independent and recognized tort. 
1 Although this problem arises most frequently in cases of arrests in the ad-
ministration of the criminal law, it is raised also in cases of arrests on civil or 
other process, and similar problems are raised in executions or attachments on real 
or personal property on either mesne or final process. Some of the cases cited 
in this paper are cases involving an officer's abuse of authority or dereliction of 
duty follmving an execution or attachment on a civil process. 
2 This article does not discuss the effect of the misconduct on the criminal 
prosecution of the prisoner for the crime for which he is arrested. See McGuire 
v. United States, 273 U. S. 95, 47 Sup. Ct. 259 (1927) ; State v. Thavanot, 225 Mo. 
545, 125 S. W. 473 (1910). It is limited to the civil liability of the actor to the 
prisoner resulting from such misconduct, or mutatis muta11dis to the owner of 
the property upon which leVY is made. 
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It will be shown later that there is abundant auth~rity for holding 
the actor liable civilly to the prisoner for any invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest of the prisoner, resulting from any of the above acts or 
omissions on the part of the actor. But a great number of cases go much 
further. There are many cases holding that the first, second and third 
types of misconduct dislodge the actor's privilege in making the arrest 
and make him liable for the entire imprisonment in the same manner as 
if the original arrest were unprivileged.3 There are a few decisions 
which give a similar effect to misconduct of the fourth type.4 But there 
is no direct decision as to the effect of misconduct of the fifth type, al-
though there are a few dicta5 which will be discussed later. 
The grounds stated for such holdings are variously given as the 
trespass ab initio doctrine ;6 or, what may be only a variation in language, 
a principle that, to make good ·his justification, the actor must show that 
he has strictly complied with the authority given him by the law ;7 or 
a frank statement of public policy in the prevention of abuse of author-
ity and in the proper administration of the law.8 
3 Infra notes 43, 57, 63 and 64. 
'Infra note 75. 
"Infra note 77. 
"Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Henderson, 9 Ga. App. 672, 72 S. E. 51 (1911); 
Brock v. Stimson, 108 Mass. 520, 521 (1871)-the court here expressed itself 
'thus': " ..... he may not perhaps in the strictest sense be said to become a tres-
passer ab initio; but he is often called such"; Barrett v. White, 3 N.H. 210 (1825). 
7 See Phillips v. Fadden, 125 Mass. 198, 202 (1878): "One who arrests the 
person of another by legal process, or other equivalent authority conferred upon 
him by law, can only justify himself by a strict compliance with the requirements 
of such process or authority." See also Gibson v. Holmes, 78 Vt. 110, 123, 62 
Atl. 11, 14 (1905). In discussing the effect of an officer's failure to return the 
process under which he levied, the latter court said: " •... instead of saying that 
the want of a return makes him a trespasser ab initio, it would be more accurate 
to say that the presence of a return is necessary to make the taking lawful ab 
initio/1 Sec also Holroyed, J., in Shorland v. Govett, 5 B. & C. 485, 489 (1826). 
In Tubbs v. Tukey, 3 Cush. 438, 440 (Mass. 1849), the court stated that when 
an officer justifies under process, he must "show that he has done ali that it was 
his duty to do." The same idea is sometimes expressed by saying that the ar-
rest is not in itself privileged, but is only a step in the process of bringing the 
prisoner before a court Thus in Brock v. Stimson, supra note 6, at 522, the 
court said: "The statute authorizes the arrest without a warrant, only as a 
preliminary step toward taking the prisoner before a court." And in Phillips 
v. Fadden, supra, at 200, this statement was approved, as was also the holding 
that the officer is "liable to an action for assault and false imprisonment if he 
omitted to take the party arrested before the proper tribunal and to complain 
against him." See also the statement in PoLLOCK, ToRTS (12th ed. 1923) 401: 
"He [the person who uses an authority given by law] is never doing a fully 
lawful act: he is rather an excusable trespasser, and becomes a trespasser without 
excuse if he exceeds his authority." 
• Boston & Maine Ry. v. Small, 85 Me. 462, 27 Atl. 349 ( 1893). See also 
Phillips v. Fadden, supra note 7, at 201; Tubbs v. Tukcy, supra note 7, at 441 
where the court said: "The principle is essential to the safe~y of the citizen, and 
to prevent the processes of the law and the action of its officers from being em-
ployed for purposes of oppression"; and Esty v. Wilmont, 15 Gray 168 (Mass. 
1860). 
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II 
Some of the forms of misconduct have little or no relation to the 
individual interests of the prisoner which are given general legal recog-
nition and protection. They are misconducts because they defeat the 
public interest to secure which the privilege is given. In this category 
falls the failure of an officer to make a full return of a warrant upon 
which the arrest is made. At the opposite extreme is the use of exces-
sive force to maintain the prisoner's custody or the commission of any 
other tort which the officer's custody of the prisoner gives him the op-
portunity to commit upon the prisoner. Such misconducts do not defeat 
the public purpose for which th~ privilege was given •and while it is the 
duty of the officer not to use excessive force in maintaining his custody 
of a prisoner,9 this duty is imposed solely to protect the individual 
interest of the prisoners. The fact that a patrolman clubs his prisoner 
as he takes him to. a station house, while a grievous wrong to the 
prisoner, does not prevent him from being brought before a court in due 
season, even though he comes with a bandaged head. There are, how-
ever, between these two extremes, certain misconducts which affect both 
the interests of the public and of the individual. Thus, an officer is 
required not only to bring his prisoner before a magistrate or court 
which is to determine whether the prisoner is to be released or held for 
trial, but also to do this without unreasonable delay.10 This requirement 
is perhaps primarily for the protection of the prisoners from an undue 
prolonging of their confinement, though there is here some tincture of 
public interest since justice should be administered speedily as well as 
certainly. Where the officer releases the prisoner, the officer's derelic-
tion save under very exceptional circumstances, injures only, or at least 
primarily, the interest of the state in having arrested persons brought 
before some tribunal competent to determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to warrant the prisoner in being held for trial or further 
investigation. If, however, the prisoner is released against his will 
and over his objection, it is possible to regard the release as being 
analogous to defamation, since, while it does not itself impute crimi-
nality to the prisoner, it does prevent him from ,clearing his reputation 
from a defamatory charge made in the warrant or implied in the fact 
of arrest without a warrant. 
The abuse of the privilege of arrest by using the custody obtained 
therein as a means of coercing the prisoner into complying with a 
demand, which has no relation to securing his appearance before a 
competent court, is more difficult to classify. While the wrong is 
primarily against the prisoner, there is a very strong public interest 
0 TORTS REsTATEMENT No. 3 (Am. L. Inst. 1927) § 157 and Comment. 
10 See infra note 52. 
/ 
HeinOnline  -- 28 Colum. L. Rev. 844 1928
844 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
in preventing such a misuse of the privilege of arrest. The successful 
use of the privilege as a means of extortion or of compelling restitu-
tion is extremely likely to be followed by the release of the prisoner 
and a compounding of the crime. 
Insofar as the conduct of the officer who has made a lawful ar-
rest not only violates the duty which, as officer, he owes to the state 
which he serves, but also invades any legally protected interests, whether 
material or sentimental, of his prisoner, it is obvious that the officer 
should incur liability, not only to the state but also to the individual 
whose interests are invaded by his conduct. On the other hand, where 
the officer has failed to comply with some requirement, the sole 
purpose of which is to secure the state's int'erest in the proper func-
tioning of its judicial machinery, a different problem is presented. Many 
of the early tort actions can be explained only on the ground that the 
interest of the state, or to put it somewhat differently, of the com-
munity en masse, could be effectually preserved only by giving a pri-
vate right of action to those individuals most directly affected by acts 
which are primarily, if not exclusively,· injurious to the state or com-
munity. Such a use of the private right of action was perhaps neces-
sary while the power of the Crown was not sufficiently established, or 
the machinery of public justice sufficiently organized, to make criminal 
liability a sufficient deterrent to or punishment of official misconduct. 
It can be justified today only if the sovereign is still so impotent as 
to be incapable of enforcing proper respect for its interest by proceed-
ings instituted by itself and if, in addition, there is reason to believe 
that the fear of a liability to pay money damages in a civil action may 
be a real deterrent to official misconduct.U · 
11 Apart from the theoretical objections to the use of civil actions for dis-
tinctly punitive and deterrent .purposes, it is submitted that there is no reason 
to believe that this abnormal variant of the doctrine of trespass ab initio has 
had or will have any substantially deterrent effect. N'ow that persons who fail 
to pay a judgment can no longer be imprisoned for debt, a fear of incurring a 
liability enforcible by a civil action can act as a deterrent only upon those who 
have asse.ts out of which the judgment can be collected. The class of persons 
who serve warrants rarely if ever possess such assets. It is significant that 
there are exceedingly few cases in which peace officers or private individuals, 
serving criminal warrants' or arresting for a crime, have been made defendants 
in a civil action for damages except where they are joined as defendants with 
the persons making the complaint or the court or magistrate issuing the warrant, 
themselves likely to be solvent persons. On the other hand, actions are constantly 
brought against officers serving civil process, generally process directing them 
to seize chattels in execution or on mesne process. The reason for this is obvious. 
In the majority of jurisdictions such persons may and do require bonds to in-
sure them against liability. The action against such an officer, though in form against 
him, is then actually against the bondsman. The judgment against the bonds-
man is no punishment for the officer and the fear of such a judgment has little 
or no deterrent effect upon him. Therefore, while a right of action for punitive 
damages may in theory appear to be an effective method of punishing official 
misconduct and deter officers therefrom, it supposes a financial position which 
those who serve warrants and make arrests rarely, if ever, possess. 
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It may be said with some confidence that the whole tendency of 
modem law is against the use of tort actions to bolster up a supposedly 
inefficient administration. The courts are reluctant to recognize new 
sentimental interests and· to impose liability for their violation, no 
matter how malevolent and inexcusable may be the conduct which 
invades them.12 There is no tendency to increase the so called "absp-
lute rights" whose violation carries with it a right to damages which, 
no matter how named, are substantially imposed as a punishment upon 
the violator. In not a few jurisdictions the right to punitive damages 
is denied by common law or by statute.13 The. tide of modem law has 
set towards the policy of recognizing the existence of some materially 
valuable interest of the plaintiff as the only proper basis for recovery 
in a tort action. In the minority of jurisdictions, which reject the 
"trespass ab initio" idea as applied to the privilege of arrest, the courts 
refuse to create a new right, or perhaps better, give legal protection 
to a new interest of the prisoner to. have the officer deal with him in 
such a manner as best tends to secure the administration of justice, by 
attaching liability to misconduct which does not invade some personal 
interest of the prisoner, universally recognized as legally protected.14 
If our society and the criminal law have developed sufficiently to be 
willing and able to punish official misconduct, then there is no room 
in our tort law for anomalous civil liability to a plaintiff who has suf-
fered no harm from the misconduct. There is then no reason for 
making an arbitrary and meaningless distinction15 between misconduct 
following the e.'Cercise of an authority granted by law and mis-
l!l Pyle v. Waechter, 202 Iowa 695, 210 N. W. 926 (1926), noted in (1927) 40 
HARV. L. REV. 771. 
13 See cases collected in (1915) 8 R. C. L. 583, n. 18; (1919) 17 C. J. 969, n. 
73; ( 1922) 16 A. L. R. 771. 
" To recognize such a right is merely a roundabout way of saying that the 
private individual is given a right to damages for the purpose of better securing 
the proper administration of justice. Such a method is necessary only to those 
who think of a right to damages as implying the pre-existence of some right 
found in the nature of things, the violation of which entails liability upon the 
violator and therefore gives the right of damages to him whose supposed right 
is violated. It is impossible in this brief compass to adequately discuss the 
psycholpgy of this point of view. The history of Anglo-American law shows 
a constant recognition of new intere~ts as worthy of legal protection. These 
interests, by being protected by a liability, whether criminal or civil, imposed upon 
those who invade them, become, to the extent to which they are protected, cap-
able of description as legal rights; but it is the liability which creates the right 
and not the right which creates the liability. · 
10 See Savage, C. J., in Allen v. Crofoot, 5 Wend. 506, 509 (N. Y. 1830) : 
"Whether this is not a distinction without a difference of principle, it is not 
necessary to inquire." 
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conduct following the exercise of an authority granted by a party,10 if, 
in both cases, the original exercise of the privilege was not wrongfulP 
III 
Legal fictions play an important role in the slow development of 
a system of law from infancy to maturity. They are almost inevitable 
in a period of transition from a mechanical, strict law to a more enlight~ 
ened and functional law. Fictions frequently are the means of progress 
from one stage to the other.18 But in a system of law characterized by 
a reasoning from judicial precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis, 
legal fictions have the feline attribute of clinging to life.10 They out~ 
grow their usefulness and live long after they should have died. They 
become strange anomalies in a new environment. Yet, such is the force 
of inertia and conservatism that, pnce having been born into the world 
and reared to maturity, many legal fictions not only refuse to pass away 
or at least show signs of senility, but, becoming tenants at sufferance, 
they grow bigger and stronger after their lease on life had long expired. 
Worse still, like recusant children, they disappoint their parents, forget 
the purpose for which they were given life and fall into vocations never 
desired, and even despised, by their creators. 
16 Although the doctrine of trespass ab initio dates much earlier than the 
Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Coke 146a (1610), it is always recalled and associated 
with that case. Coke reports that "first, it was resolved when an entry, authority 
or licence, is given, to any one by the law, and he doth abuse it, he shall be a 
trepasser ab initio: but where an entry, authority, or licence, is given by the 
party, and he abuses it, there he must be punished for his abuse, but shall not be 
a trespasser ab initio." Ibid. 146a, 146b. As a second proposition, "It was re-
solved per totam c1eriam, that not doing, cannot make the party who has authority 
or licence by law a trespasser ab initio, because not doing is no trespass .... " 
17 Both the facts and the opinion in Boston & Maine Ry. v. Small, supra 
note 8, show clearly that the liability is imposed upon the officer as a punishment 
for his official misconduct and without regard for any harm which it may do 
to the private interests of the prisoner or the person whose goods were seized. 
The defendant officer entered upon the plaintiff's premises to execute a search 
warrant and seize any liquor he might find there. He found liquor but did not 
seize it because of an erroneous belief that it was not subject to seizure. The 
officer was held liable for the trespass committed in making the search. The 
court's opinion· embraced the doctrine of trespass ab initio, placed it squarely 
on the ground of public policy and discarded the orthodox distinction between 
subsequent misfeasance and nonfeasance. For a significant contrast in the 
English attitude, compare Canadian Pacific Wine Co. v. Tuley, 2 A. C. 417 (1921) 
where the Privy Council held that a sheriff who seized more goods than his 
warrant authorized was liable only for the e...,;:cess and not for the part that was 
subject to seizure. 
18 Compare the part played by fiction in the problems raised by the inclusion 
of corporations within the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the Federal 
courts. See HENDERSON, THE PosiTION OF FoREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN 
CoNSTITUTIONAL- LAw (1918) 50-100. Also see (1927) 40 HARV. L. REv. 772, 
n. 4. 
19 See Smith, S11rviving Fictions (1917-18) 27 YALE L. J. 147, 317. 
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The fiction of trespass ab initio had its origin in the ancient law of 
distress.20 It looks like one of the many restrictions on the privileges of 
self-help, which were the bane of primitive law. The early development 
of the fiction seems to have been confined almost wholly to the abuse 
of such privilege.21 Thus, the doctrine of trespass ab initio was in-
voked where cattle were seized damage feasant, where a reversioner 
entered to see if the tenant in possession was committing waste, where 
a commoner entered to see his cattle,22 or where one entered on another's 
land to hunt ravenous beasts of prey.23 Furthermore, as long as pro-
cedure was the life-blood of law, this .fiction served to overcome cer-
tain procedural difficulties which tended to obstruct the administration 
of justice in particular cases.24 And finally, in the absence of a law of 
evidence, this doctrine provided a crude rule of thumb by which to de-
termine a man's · intention25 at a time when it was believed that "the 
thought of man is not triable."26 
Always jealous of the growth of the executive power and careful 
to provide remedies for abuses of authority,27 the common law was able 
to provide a full breast for the nurture of this suckling. It grew into, 
or was "ossified"28 into, a universal principle that the subsequent abuse 
of an authority granted by law-as distinguished from an authority 
"'See 7 HoLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAw (1925) 499. It is a. 
significant reflection on the doctrine of trespass ab initio that it was early abol-
ished by statute both in England and in some of the United States in cases of 
distress-the very cases in which the doctrine was first developed. See 11 GEo. 
II, c. 19, § 19; Sackrider v. McDonald, 10 Johns. 253, 257 (N.Y. 1813). 
01 See 2 BLACKSTONE, Co:M:-rENTARIES (Cooley's 3rd ed. 1884) 14, where the 
learned ·editor appends the following generalization to Blackstone's discussion 
of trespass ab initio in the law of distress : "Generally a party pursuing a remedy 
e~ parte which may result in depriving another of his property, must pursue 
strictly the authority the law gives him .... " · 
"" See Six Carpenters' Case, supra note 16. 
03 See 3 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES (1770) 213. 
"'See Ames, History of Trover (1897) 11 HARv. L. REv. 277, 287-88; 
LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 61-63. 
""See the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, then Justice of the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Rubin, 165 Mass. 453, 455, 
43 N. E. 200 (1896). "The rule that, if a man abuse an authority given him by 
the law, he becomes a trespasser ab initio, although now ·it looks like a rule of 
substantive law and is limited to a certain class of cases, in its origin was only 
a rule of evidence by which, when such rules were few and rude, the original 
intent was presumed conclusively from the subsequent conduct." This theory 
finds support in Coke's statement in the Six Carpenters' Case, supra note 16, that 
"the law adjudges by the subsequent act, quo animo, or to what intent, he en-
tered; for acta e~teriora i11dicant interiora secreta.'' See also infra note 29. 
But note the language of the Maine court in Boston and Maine Ry. v. Small, 
supra note 8, at 446, 27 Atl. at 351: "This dictum· [just quoted from Coke] has been 
often repeated in various forms. It seems, however, to be artificial and even 
fictitious. An officer may often, in fact, begin with the best and most lawful 
intent and yet forfeit his protection by subsequent misconduct." 
"'7 HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 20, at 500. 
21 Ibid. 
23 Commonwealth v. Rubin, supra note 25, at 456. 
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g>anted by a party-annulled the authority and made the abuser a tres-
passer ab initio.29 But while this fictitious creature was thus developing 
in parts, decay was eating away other parts. By the time of the Si~ 
Carpenters' Case,30 it was well established that it could not be applied 
in cases where the subsequent misconduct consisted of non-feasance31-
exactly the type of cases in which the fiction was first invoked.32 Such 
was its peculiar g>owth ! 
In England, the fiction continued to decay-or, at least, it grew 
""The courts seem to have been strongly influenced by the reason for the 
doctrine, as it was stated by Lord Coke and later by Mr. Justice Holmes. See 
supra note 25. Thus in some jurisdictions, in addition to the rule that non-
feasance is not sufficient to render a lawful exercise of a privilege wrongful 
ab initio, certain restrictions are put upon the doctrine of trespass ab initio 
which come close to reducing the doctrine solely to a rule of evidence. The V cr-
mont court has stated that, to render lawful conduct illegal ab i11ilio, the sub-
sequent conduct "must be a positive and active wrong, and of such a character 
as to fairly justify the implication that the original entry was for the purpose 
of committing the wrong, and not bo11a fide made under the authority which the 
law gave, and for the purpose for which the law gave it. ..• " Stone v. Knapp, 
29 Vt. 501, 503 (1857). See also Stoughton v. Mott, 25 Vt. 668, 673 (1853). 
In Page v. De Puy, 40 Ill. 506, 513 (1866) the Illinois court statc'd that: 
"To render the officer a trespasser ab i11itio, there must be some positive, wr011g-
ful act, as an abuse of the authority which seems to give character to the original 
lawful act, and which inclines to the belief that the legal authority was only em-
ployed for the purpose of enabling the officer to obtain the means of committing 
the wrong-this seems to be the rule." See also Green, ]., dissenting in Barrett 
v. White, 3 N. H. 210, 217 (1825): " ... when the officer wholly departs from 
the course pointed out for him by the law, he may be considered as intending 
to do so from the beginning, and as making use of the process of law for a mere 
pretense and cover .... Where, however, the officer evidently means to do his 
duty, faithfully and properly, in pursuance of the authority given him by law, 
but commits some errors and mistakes .... the officer is not liable as a tres-
passer, though he may be liable in case, for the damage done by his errors and 
mistakes to the person; who sustains it." But the court held otherwise, saying, 
" ... an attentive e."amination of all the authorities will clearly shew, that a 
man may become a trespasser ab initio not only by using an authority, which the 
law giyes him, for improper purposes, or by pushing the e."ercisc of it beyond its 
due limits, hut by exercising it in an improper and illegal manner to the pre-
judice of another." Ibid. 230. See, however, the statement of Fowler, ]., speaking 
for the whole court in Taylor v. Jones, 42 N. H. 25, 35 (1860): "Such an error 
or mistake as a person oi ordinary care and common intelligence might commit, 
will not amount to an abuse; but there must be such a complete departure from 
the line of duty ... such an active aud wilful wrong perpetrated-as will 
warrant the conclusion that its perpetrator intended from the first to do wrong, 
and to use his legal authority as a cover for his illegal conduct.'' (Citing the dis-
senting opinion of Green, ]., in Barrett v. White, supra.) 
mg Coke 146a (1610). 
31 This distinction has led to the usual confusion as to what conduct con-
stitutes misfeasance and what, nonfeasance. The distinction is, at best, a difficult 
one. In connection with our problem, it has not been strictly observed. Sec note 
to Barrett v. White in 14 Am. Dec. 352, 367-369 (1880). The Maine court, adopt-
ing the doctrine of trespass ab initio, discarded the distinction between m'is-
feasance and nonfeasance as being "a bit of sterile, verbal syllogization. It 
has borne no good fruit." Boston & Maine R. v. Small, s•ePra note 8, at 467, 
27 Atl. at 357. 
32 See Ames, History of Trover (1897) 11 HARV. L. REV. 277, 288; LECTURES 
ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 62-63. 
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no more.33 Many American courts on the contrary not only adopted 
the creature but attempted to nurse it back to health. 34 Although no 
cases have been found invoking the fiction, except in the field of arrest, 
where interests of personality have been invaded, the fiction was applied 
in its full rigor in the field of arrest and in cases of levies on civil 
process.35 In recent times, however, there have been several judicial 
expressions of disfavor.36 Within t:he last year the United States 
Supreme Court has taken the opportunity to frown upon the doctrine.37 
Law writers have long counseled its death.38 
Certainly the fiction of trespass ab initio ought to be banished, at 
least from the law of arrest. The argument against its retention as a 
deterrent to official misconduct has already been set forth above. We 
are no longer encircled by a maze of procedure from which we need seek 
this avenue of escape. Nor are we much troubled by the difficulty of 
trying the "thought of man." Intention is ascertained daily in our courts. 
In criminal law, in cases of fraud, deceit, assault, indeed in the great 
bulk of our law, intention is important and triable. The maxim, acta 
e.xteriora indicant interiora secreta, may well be preserved-and it is of 
great service. Subsequent acts may well serve as evidence of prior in-
tent.39 But it is not conclusive and should not be given the artificial 
quality of conclusive proof. 
It is necessary to distinguish sharply between the effect of miscon-
duct subsequent to an arrest as evidence to prove that the purpose of the 
arrest was not to secure the proper administration of justice but to 
33 No late English case has been found in which the doctrine of trespass 
ab initio was successfully invoked, in any case involving either arrest with or 
without a warrant or the seizure of goods under civil process. Where it was re-
lied upon by counsel, the courts have managed to avoid it. For example, in 
Smith v. Egginton, 7 A. & E. 167 (K.. B. 1837), the court almost confined the 
doctrine to a rule of evidence. Littledale, J.; said at p. 176: "The rule is said 
to rest upon this ;-that the subsequent illegality shews the party to have contem-
plated an illegality all along, so that the whole becomes a trespass. But here 
the sheriff could not, from the first, have had in view the detention of the plain-
tiff after the time should have expired." Other English cases will be discussed 
presently in the text. See also Stoughton v. Mott, supra note 29, at 674: "It 
is obvious from the slightest examination of the English books, that this doc-
trine of making public officers trespassers ab initio, is very much discountenanced 
of late ..•. " See also S1tpra note 17. 
"'See cases coJlected in 14 Am. Dec. 352 (1880), and see the extensions of the 
doctrine in Boston & Maine Ry. v. Smail, supra note 8; Blanchard v. Dow, 32 
Me. 557 (185!); Carter v. AJlen, 59 Me. 296 (1871). 
""See Carrier v. Esbaugh, 70 Pa. 239 (1871); Hall v. Ray, 40 Vt. 576 (1868). 
""See Stoughton v. Mott, S11Pra note 29, at 674; A. T. & S. F. R. R. v. Hinsdell, 
76 Kan. 74, 90 Pac. 800, 12 L. R. A. (N.s.) 94 (1907) ; Oxford v. Berry, 204 
Mich. 197, 170 N. W. 83 (1918). 
31 McGuire v. United States, S1tpra note 2. , 
33 Holmes, The Path of the Law (1896) 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469; Smith, 
op. cit. supra note 19, at 164; CLERK & LINDSELL, ToRTS (7 ed. 1921) 202; PoL-
LOCK, ToRTS (12 ed. 1923) 402; SALMOND, TORTS (6 ed. 1924) 232. 
33 Commonwealth v. Rubin, supra note 25. 
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commit the misconduct, and the effect of a misconduct, subsequent to 
an arrest for a proper purpose, as in itself depriving the officer of the im-
munity otherwise normally created by the privileged character of the 
arrest. The privilege of arrest is given to secure the administration of 
justice, generally by bringing an actual or supposed criminal before a 
magistrate who can decide whether or not he should be held for trial. 
Even though the circumstances are such as to justify an arrest which is 
made for such a purpose, the arrest is not privileged if made for any 
other purpose.40 And this is so irrespectiv~ of whether such other pur-
pose is otherwise wrongful.41 Where the officer's misconduct is an abuse 
of his custody to force his prisoner to pay him or a third person a sum 
of money which may or may not be justly payable by the prisoner, even 
an unsuccessful effort to compel such a payment tends to prove that 
the arrest was made for that purpose and not to secure the ends of 
justice.42 In fact, it is evidence, the probative force of which is often 
so great that it would not only permit but require the jury to find that 
such was the purpose. Except in the e.xceedingly unusual situations 
where the circumstances show that the purpose to misuse the custody 
was an afterthought, it is therefore of little practical moment whether 
such a misconduct is treated as proving that no privilege ever arose 
or as destroying a previously existing privilege. On the other hand, a 
misconduct such as unreasonable delay in bringing the prisoner promptly 
before a magistrate or the release of a prisoner soon after his arrest has, 
normally, no such probative force. It is unfortunately true that the 
police do occasionally arrest a man whose conduct has made him amen-
able to lawful arrest, not for the purpose of bringing him to trial for such 
conduct, but for the purpose of examining him as to his own or some 
third party's connection with some other and more serious offense. If 
such is the case, the officer is making the arrest for the purpose of 
•• ToRTS REsTATEMENT No. 3, (Am. L. Inst. 1927) § 152. As regards arrest on 
civil process, see note in (1926) 26 CoLUMBIA LAW REv. 1007. For arrest on a 
"bench warrant," see Oxford v. Berry, s11pra note 36. · 
<1 It is necessary to distinguish between the purpose for which the arrest is 
made and the motive which actuates the person to act for that purpose. Thus, it 
is stated in CoMMENTARIES O'N ToRTS REsTATEMENT No. 3 (Am. L. Inst. 1927) 
§ 152: "If however, the actor makes the arrest for the purposes stated in this 
Section, the fact that he has an ulterior motive in making it does not make the 
arrest unprivileged." 
"'In Mullen·v. Brown, 138 Mass. 114 (1884) the plaintiff, who had been ar-
rested on a valid warrant and brought before a proper court in due season, 
brought an action for false arrest against the officer who arrested him and against 
the complainant alleging that the latter had sworn out the warrant in order to 
extort money from him. There was no evidence that either of the defendants 
~ade any attempt to extort money or compel the plaintiff to pay any debt. The 
court affirmed the judgment entered upon a verdict for the defendants in the 
court .below, holding that the defendants' motive was immaterial, if their object was 
to bring the plaintiff before a court and this was done in a regular manner; 
his remedy, if any, being an action for malicious prosecution. 
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obtaining the power to extort information from his prisoner, and the 
situation is substantially identical with that in which an officer makes an 
arrest in order to gain power to extort money or force the restitution 
of a chattel. But in the great majority of cases the delay is obviously due 
to some carelessness or oversight on the part of the officer or to some 
other cause occuring after the arrest. So too, a prisoner's release is us-
ually due to causes subsequent to the arrest. It requires a vivid imagina-
tion to conceive of an officer making an arrest for the purpose of releas-
ing his prisoner.,In these situations, therefore, it is of great practical mo-
ment to discriminate between misconduct as evidence that the original 
arrest was unprivileged and misconduct as destroying an existing priv-
ilege. 
IV 
Now let us consider in detail the specific forms of misconduct fol-
lowing a privileged arrest. 
1. There are a number of cases stating that an officer's failure to 
return the process under which he makes an arrest or levy renders him 
liable for the entire arrest and imprisonment as a trespasser ab initio.43 
It is to be noted, first, that this principle is out of line with the settled 
doctrine of trespass ab initio. The Siz Carpenters' Case44 resolved 
it as settled law that mere nonfeasance is not enough to turn a privileged 
act into a trespass. Failure to return the process can be nothing if not 
nonfeasance. Some courts, indeed, have admitted this rule to be an 
exception to the second half of the trespass ab initio doctrine.45 Sec-
ondly, it is to be noted that in none of the cases on this point is there 
anything to show that the prisoner was brought before a magistrate for 
a hearing. Indeed, the implication seems to be the other way. In none 
of these cases, then, is there anything to discredit the statement of 
Bingham, J., in Clark v. Tilton,46 that "an officer could not avail himself 
of civil or criminal process to justify an arrest, unless he returned the 
writ or produced the prisoner47 with the warrant before the court to 
which the process was returnable. . . ." If the prisoner is brought be-
fore a magistrate, it would indeed be outrageous to make the officer 
liable to the prisoner for the arrest simply because the officer failed to 
comply with what then is a matter of office detail. It is believed that such 
is not the law. 
"'Tubbs v. Tukey, sttpra note 7; Gibson v. Holmes, 78 Vt. 110, 62 Atl. 11, 4 . 
L. R. A. (N.s.) 451 (1905) ; Anderson v. Cowles, 72 Conn. 335, 44 Atl. 477 (1899) ; 
See Boston & Maine Ry. v. Small, supra note 8 ; Shorland v. Govett, sttPra note 
7; Rowland v. Veale, 1 Cowp. 18 (1774). In Tubbs v. Tukey, sttPra, the war-
rant did not command its return, but the court held that a return was necessary 
and the officer was liable as a trespasser ab i11itio if he failed to return. 
"Sttpra note 30. . 
'"E.g., Ferrin v. Symonds, 11 N.H. 363 (1840). 
•• 74 N.H. 330, 332, 68 Atl. 335, 336 (1907). "Italics ours. 
HeinOnline  -- 28 Colum. L. Rev. 852 1928
852 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
The rule that a failure to return the process under which an arrest 
is made renders the actor liable for the arrest ab i1titio applies only to 
those persons charged with the duty of making the return.48 Subor-
dinate officers who are under no such duty,411 or persons who aid officers 
in making an arrest,50 are entitled to the protection of the process even 
though the process is not returned-unless, possibly they had sponsored 
or encouraged the omission.51 
2. The cases are unanimous in holding that one who has made a 
privileged arrest must use due diligence to present his prisoner promptly 
before a proper tribunal.52 Unreasonable delay is not justifiable, even 
though the delay was for the purpose of investigating the charges,53 or 
of collecting witnesses,54 or of confronting the prisoner with the com-
plainant or prosecuting attorney.55 In such cases, there is a strong prob-
ability that by reason of this lack of diligence, the prisoner's confine-
ment is unduly prolonged.56 For the undue part of the imprisonment, . 
the actor should, of course, be liable. But should he be liable for more-
even for the lawful part of the imprisonment ?57 Here there is no reason 
•• Freeman v. Blewitt, 1 Salk. 409 ( 1701). 
'"Ellis v. Cleveland, 54 Vt. 437 (1882); Rowland v. Veale, s11pra note 43; 
Freeman v. Blewitt, supra note 48. 
"'Dehm v. Hinman, 56 Conn. 320, 15 At!. 741 (1887). 
01 Anderson v. Cowles, stiPra note 43. See also Sands & Co. v. Norvell, 126 
Va. 384, 101 S. E. 569 (1919). In Clark v. Tilton, supra note 46, it was held that, 
where the prisoner himself requested that the warrant be not returned, the non-re· 
turn of the warrant did not render the officer a trespasser ab i11itio. See comment, 
i11jra note 63. 
'"'Von Arx v. Shafer, 241 Fed. 649 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927); Gomez v. Scan-
lon, 155 Calif. 528, 102 Pac. 12 (1909) ; Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Henderson, 
supra 'note 6; Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 286, 64 N. E. 875 (1902) ; Linnen 
v. Banfield, 114 Mich. 93, 72 N. W. 1 (1897) ; Anderson v. Beck, 64 Miss. 
113, 8 So. 167 (1886); Cochran v. Toher, 14 Minn. 385 (1869); Davis v. Carro!11 172 App. Div. 729, 159 N. Y. Supp. 568 (4th Dept. 1916); Jackson v. Miller, 1:14 
N. J. L. 189, 86 At!. 50 (1913); Leger v. Warren, 62 Oh. St. 500, 57 N. E. 506 
(1900); Newhall v. Egan, 28 R. I. 584, 68 At!. 471 (1908); Wright v. Court, 4 
B. & C. 596 (1825). See Note (1909) 13 Ann. Cas. 984; and Note (1914 A) 
Ann. Cas. 717. 
""Keefe v. Hart, 213 Mass. 476, 100 N.E. 558 (1913). 
"'VonArx v. Shafer, supra note 52; Wright v. Court, supra note 52. But cf. 
Therriault v. Breton, 114 Me. 137, 95 At!. 699 (1915). 
"'Harness v. Steele, SliPra note 52; Wright v. Templeton, 80 Vt. 358, 67 At!. 
817 (1907). 
""So too, prolongation of the imprisonment probably results when the officer 
takes his prisoner to a magistrate in the wrong county having no jurisdiction of 
the case. Francisco v. State, 24 N. J. L. 30 (1853) ; Gibson v. Holmes, supra note 7. 
01 There are few cases in which this problem is treated as a separate matter. 
In most of the cases where the question was raised, the unreasonable delay was 
.followed by a release of the prisoner-the third type of misconduct next to be 
discussed. In some of the cases the courts do not deal with the question specifi-
cally; they simply hold the defendant liable in an action of false imprisonment, 
leaving the implication that damages are to be recovered for the entire im-
prisonment. But there are specific holdings and expressions to this effect. Pied-
mont Hotel Co. v. Henderson, supra note 6; Snead v. Bonnoil, 49 App. Div. 330, 
63 N. Y. Supp. 553 (1st Dept. 1900); Leger v. Warren, supra note 52; Gibson v. 
Holmes, supra note 7; and see Clark v. Tilton, supra note 46, and cases collected 
therein. 
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in the policy of guarding against official misconduct which would justify 
the imposition of liability for the arrest ab initio. The actor has here 
violated the prisoner's interest in freedom of locomotion. He has com-
mitted a recognized tort for which an action is universally given. There 
is here a peg on which to hang punitive damages. There is no need of a 
fictitious relation back to punish the officer for his misconduct. Reason 
would seem to be against the numerical weight of authority on this point. 
And a minority of courts have held that liability should be limited to the 
unwarranted part of the imprisonment.58 These decisions exhibit the 
correct treatment of the misconduct, namely, as some evidence of an 
original unlawful purpose in making the arrest.59 
A very similar problem is raised where an officer levies on real or 
personal property and subsequently remains on the premises for too 
long a time, or refuses to restore the property at the proper time. It 
has been held that a refusal to restore property so taken, being a non-
feasance, does not render the actor a trespasser ab initio.60 This is in 
accord with the second resolve in the Six Carpenters' Case. But English 
courts have consistently held that an officer who remains too long on the 
premises after a levy is not a trespasser ab initio,61 although each day's 
presence is a new trespass. 62 This holding can not be explained by the 
second resolve in the Six Carpenters' Case. If the defendant's presence 
on the premises is a new trespass, t:hen it is a misfeasance and within 
the terms of the first resolve in that case. These decisions, therefore, 
show a clear desire to restrict the scope of the trespass'ab initio doct'rine. 
3. There is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard to the 
effect of an actor's release of a prisoner, whom he had lawfully arrested, 
without presentment before a proper judicial tribunal. Some courts 
hold the actor liable for the arrest and the entire imprisonment, unless 
the prisoner as a condition of his release voluntarily agrees to waive 
his right to damages, which the release, without such an agreement, 
would give him.63 Other courts intimate that even a definite waiver 
""A. T. & S. F. R. R. v. Hinsdell, supra note 36; Friesenhan v. Maines, 137 
Mich. 10, 100 N. W. 172 (1904); Oxford v. Berry, supra note 36; semble, Mul-
berry v. Fuelhart, 203 Pa. 573, 53 Atl. 504 (1902). 
"'See Oxford v. Berry, supra note 36, at 215, 170 N. W. at 89: " •.• an un-
lawful detention, following a lawful arrest by a sheriff, does not make him a 
trespasser ab initio, unless the original arrest was made with the intent of being 
used for a subsequent wrong." 
"'Taylor v. Jones, 42 N.H. 25 (1860) and cases cited therein at page 34. 
01 Lee v. Dangai, Grant & Co., 1 Q.B. 231, 242 (1892). 
62 Ash v. Dawnay, 8 Ex. 237 (1852) ; Playfair v. Musgrove, 14 M. & W. 239 
(1845). 
03 Stewart v. Feeley, 118 Iowa 524, 92 N. W. 670 (1902) ; Caffrey v. Drugan, 
144 Mass. 294, 11 N. E. 96 (1887); Joyce v. Parkhurst, 150 Mass. 243, 22 N. E. 
899 (1889) ; Bates v. Reynolds, 195 Mass. 549, 81 N. E. 260 (1907) ; Clark v. 
Tilton, supra note 46; Venable v. Huddy, 77 N.J. L. 351, 72 Atl. 10 (1909). These 
cases would seem to indicate that civil liability is imposed upon the officer only 
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of this sort by the prisoner will not prevent a premature release from 
having the effect of making the officer liable for the originally privileged 
imprisonment. 64 While still other courts hold the actor to no liability 
under such circumstances.m; Moreover, some cases indicate a distinction 
between an arrest for a misdemeanor and an arrest on suspicion of 
felony, imposing liability for the entire imprisonment in the event of a 
release in the former case, but not in the latter.66 
If the prisoner is guilty of the crime charged against him, it is clear 
that he is probably benefited by his release rather than injured. But if 
innocent, the prisoner may be aggrieved, as indicated above, by the loss 
of his opportunity to obtain of an official refutation of the charges laid 
against him. If the prisoner's personality or reputation is thus injured, 
he should have compensation. And, if no other remedy is available, a 
remedy by way of trespass ab initio is probably justifiable. But it is 
doubtful, in the first place, whether the prisoner really is injured in the 
manner above indicated ;67 and it is highly doubtful, in the second place, 
whether the release does deprive the prisoner of all opportunity to ob-
tain an official refutation of the charges against him. 68 Finally, no case 
has been found which draws any distinction betw~en an innocent and a 
guilty prisoner in this connection. 
In those jurisdictions which hold that a.release of a prisoner with-
out presentment before a proper court entails liability on the part of 
the actor for the entire arrest and imprisonment, unless the prisoner 
agrees to waive his right to damages, no express agreement is required. 
It is there generally held that it is for the jury to say whether or not such 
an agreement is to be "implied" in or "inferred" from a request for a 
release, or a "free and intelligent acceptance thereof."60 The New Hamp-
for the purpose of protecting the interest of the prisoner. For, if the liability 
were imposed for the protection of the state's interest in having arrested persons 
brought to trial, the prisoner could not waive it. It would therefore follow that 
liability should be imposed only if the prisoner suffered damage by his release. 
But these courts stop short of the logical step and impose liability for the arrest 
and entire imprisonment regardless of whether or not the prisoner was injured 
by the release, by the restoration of his freedom of locomotion. See also supra 
note 51. 
"'Newhall v. Egan, SttPra note 52; and see Tobin v. Bell, 73 App. Div. 41, 46, 
76 N. Y. Supp. 425, 529 (4th Dept. 1902), where the court said: "I£ the rule 
[that, by the release, the officer becomes liable for the arrest and imprisonment] 
where otherwise it might result in compounding offenses of this kind ••. !' 
"" See A. T. & S. F. R. R. v. Hinsdell, s.upra note 36; Harness v. Steele, 
supra note 52; Mulberry v. Fuelhart, S11Pra note 58; Mayer v. Vaughan, 11 K. B. 
340 (Que. 1902). 
00 See Therriault v. Breton, sttpra note 54; Burke v. Bell, 36 Me. 317 (1853). 
61 The release itself would seem to be a sufficient refutation of the charge 
of criminality implied in the arrest. 
68 In the first place, the prisoner could insist on not being released without a 
hearing. But even if he is forcibly released, he could probably still get either a 
hearing or an official refutation of the charge against him. 
"" See the cases cited supra note 63. 
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shire court has stated that, to relieve the officer from liability, it must 
appear that "the prisoner had so conducted [himself] with reference to 
the officer's omission [to bring the prisoner before a court] that he 
had estopped himself from interposing the omission to the officer's use 
of the process"70 as a justification of the arrest. In almost all the cases, 
there was nothing from which to infer a waiver of damages or to raise 
such an estoppel save the fact that the prisoner had accepted his re-
lease proffered by an officer, who had exerted no pressure upon· him to 
force his acceptance thereof. In none of the cases, in which a free and 
uncoerced acceptance of a release has been held sufficient to warrant the 
jury in inferring the waiver of damages, was there any evidence to so 
much as suggest that the prisoner had any idea that, but for such a 
waiver, the officer would be under any liability to him. No case has been 
discovered where the jury failed to find a waiver of damages from are-
quest for, or an uncoerced acceptance of, a release. While these jurisdic-
tions seem to require an agreement to waive the right to damages, or to 
release the officer from liability, it may fairly be concluded that all that 
is required is a willingness on the part of the prisoner to be released from 
custody.71 Such a willingness may appear either from the prisoner's 
request to be released or from his free acceptance of his release where he 
is given an option to stay. But a mere compliance with an order to 
leave, when his wishes are not consulted and he is not given an option 
to stay, will not warrant the jury in finding that the prisoner is willing 
to accept his liberty.72 
Before leaving the subject of release without presentment before 
a proper tribunal, it is to be noted that it has been held that the actor's 
duty to present the prisoner before ,a proper tribunal is not delegable, 
even to a superior officer in accordance with the regular practice. If 
the second officer release the prisoner without presentment, the officer 
making the arrest is under the same liability as if he had himself· re-
leased the prisoner.73 
7° Clark v. Tilton, supra note 46. 
71 See ToRTS REsTATEMENT No: 3 (Am. L. Inst. 1927) § 161 (d) and Comment. 
l" Stewart v. Feeley, supra note 63. 
73 Davis v. Carroll, supra note 52; Leger v. Warren, supra note 52. In both 
of these cases, the defendants trusted to the officer to whom they turned over 
the custody of the prisoner and did nothing more with regard to the prisoners. 
No case appears to have dealt with a situation in which, an arrest being made at 
night, the officer making the arrest must take his prisoner to a station house for 
safekeeping, and during the night the prisoner is released under such circum-
stances as to make his release improper. In such a case it seems too much to re-
quire that the officer should so far distrust the fidelity of those in charge of the 
police station that he should forego his rest or suspend his other duties to main-
tain a constant supervision over their conduct. It is, therefore, possible that a 
distinction might be drawn between the two situations and that it might be held 
that the officer placing his prisoner overnight in a police station for safekeeping 
is not liable for his prisoner's improper release before he himself has an oppor-
HeinOnline  -- 28 Colum. L. Rev. 856 1928
856 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
4. There are very few cases involving the effect of misconducts of 
the fourth class mentioned at the outset of this paper. This type of sub-
sequent misconduct is very strong evidence of an improper purpose in 
the original arrest-a purpose which would render the arrest unprivil-
eged.74 But, assuming a proper purpose for the original arrest, the 
cases on this point that have been found are quite unsatisfactory and 
establish no rule. It may be said, however, that the American cases 
seem to indicate that the effect of misconduct of this type would be the 
same as tP,at of misconduct of the types already discussed.70 The 
English cases, however, indicate that misconduct of this type would not 
render the actor liable as a trespasser ab initio.16 This is in line with 
the general tendency of the English law not to give misconduct a retroac-
tive effect so as to make an originally privileged arrest wrongful. 
I 
tunity to return to the station to see to the bringing of the prisoner before a 
magistrate for hearing. See, however, Keefe v. Hart, szepra note 53, in which 
the action was brought against two defendants, one of whom was the officer who 
had arrested the plaintiff and the other was the officer to whom the plaintiff had 
been entrusted for safekeeping. The latter released the plaintiff in the absence of 
his co-defendant. A judgment in favor of both defendants was set aside. The 
court held that the circumstances precluded an implication of an agreement by 
the plaintiff to waive his right to be taken before a magistrate and therefore set 
aside a verdict which the jury had found in favor of both. The court, in its 
opinion, makes no allusion to the fact that the plaintiff was released by only one 
of the defendants and the other was not present and did not know of, much 
less consent to, the release. 
"See szepra notes 41 and 42 relative to the distinction between the purpose of 
an arrest and the motive of the actor in arresting for such purpose. 
""Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350 (N.Y. 1829); Robbins v. Swift, 86 Me. 197, 29 
Atl. 981 (1894) ; see Clark v. Tilton, szepra note 46, at 333, 68 Atl. at 337. 
In Bergeron v. Payton, 106 Wis. 377, 82 N. W. 291 (1900), the defendant, a 
peace officer, had unsuccessfully attempted to force the plaintiff to restore to a 
bank money which it had overpaid him. The unsuct;essful attempt did not pre-
vent the officer from bringing the prisoner promptly before a magistrate. The 
court made no reference to the fact that the officer had abused his custody of the 
prisoner by attempting to force him to make restitution. A verdict for the plain-
tiff :was sustained on the ground that the jury was justified in holdin&', from the 
defendant's conduct, that the purpose of the arrest was to force restitution and 
not to secure the prisoner's punishment for his statutory misdemeanor in know-
ingly receiving the over-payment. See Carter v. Allen, 59 Me. 296 (1871). Cf, 
Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N. H. 508 (1826); Severance v. Kimball, 8 N. H. 386 
(1836)-in both these cases it was held that the plaintiff could maintain an action 
for the recovery of money which was received from him in consideration of re-
lease from an arrest which the court found was made for the purpose ofo ex-
torting the money. See also Shaw v. Spooner, 9 N. H. 197 (1838). In Clark v. 
Tilton, stepra note 46, it was held that if the plaintiff voluntarily gave his mort-
gage and was not coerced by the officer, the latter was not liable. 
""In Shorland v. Govett, stepra note 7, the Court of Kings Bench 
had before it an action for trespass for breaking and entering plaintiff's dwelling-
place. The defendant justified his entry under a fi fa. The plaintiff's replication 
was to the effect tl)at defendant extortionately demanded and exacted a sum 
greater than that for which the writ was issued. The court sustained a demurrer 
to the replication on the ground that the defendant's subsequent extortionate de-
mand did not amount to a new trespass and that it could not be reasonable to 
suppose that the original entry was for the purpose of extortion and held that 
the defendant was liable only for the excessive amount which he had extorted 
and did not become a trespasser ab initio, and so, liable for the entire amount 
which he had received, or for damages for his entry. 
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5. It is extremely curious that in the one situation in which the 
misconduct of officers most frequently occurs and most vitally concerns 
the individual interests of the prisoner, namely, the use of excessive force 
to maintain a cqstody which the officer has taken under the privileged 
arrest, there is no case which expressly holds that such misconduct makes 
the officer liable for the originally privileged arrest. In a nisi prius case 
in Delaware77 a justice of the Supreme Court, sitting as trial judge, used 
language which might possibly be construed as favorable to the view that 
the defendant officer became a trespasser ab initio by depriving the 
plaintiff of suitable clothing while in custody. On the other hand, the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky,78 in an opinion intended for the guidance 
of the trial court upon a new trial ordered by it, expressly stated that 
the court should "submit to the jury only the amount of damages which 
the plaintiff sustained by reason of any assault and battery committed by 
the defendant"79 officer upon the plaintiff while in his lawful custody. 
It held that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the arrest 
was privileged and that plaintiff could recover nothing for the arrest. 
Even in those jurisdictions which hold that the misconduct of an 
officer· after an otherwise privileged arrest makes him liable for the 
original arrest, as well as for such injury as is done to his prisoner by his 
misconduct, the officer's. misconduct merely entails a penalty of liability 
for the original arrest. It does not affect the immunity given to one 
who assists an officer in making the arrest, unless he is a ·party to the 
officer's subsequent misconduct.80 Nor does the officer's misconduct 
destroy all the legal effects of his original privilege in so far as they con-
cern his own part in the arrest. One who uses force in resisting a priv-
ileged arrest is criminally punishable, no matter how grossly the officer 
who makes it may subsequently misconduct himself. 81 
While the ~umerical weight of authority is still to the effect that 
one who has made a privileged arrest forfeits, by his subsequent mis-
.,., Petit v. Colmery, 20 Del. 266, 55 Atl. 344 (1903). 
78 Grau v. Forge, 183 Ky. 521, 209 S.W. 369 (1919). 
'19 Ibid. 529, 209 S.W. at 372. The defendant, a peace officer, having ar-
rested the plaintiff, committed a serious battery upon him while taking him to the 
station-house. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff upon instructions which 
permitted the jury to find that the original arrest was unprivileged. The Su-
preme Court reversed the judgment on the ground that there was no evidence 
upon which the jury could have found that the arrest was unlawful. There is 
nothing in the report to show that any argument was addressed to the court 
upon the question as to whether the officer's subsequent misconduct destroyed the 
i~munity which the privileged character of the arrest would otherwise have con-
ferred upon him. None the less, fhe above quoted language of the court was not 
mere dictum since it was intended for the guidance of the trial court upon the 
new trial ordered by the Supreme Court. 
""Dehm v. Hinman, supra note 50; Van Brunt v. Schenck, 11 Johns. 377 
(N.Y. 1814). Cf. also supra note 49. 
81 Commonwealth v. Tobin, 108 Mass. 426 (1871). 
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conduct, the immunity conferred by his privilege, the cases are confined 
to a comparatively small number of the many American jurisdictions. 
In those jurisdictions in which the question is not concluded by early 
authority, there is a pronounced tendency to the contrarx. This tendency 
is sound and should be followed. The whole doctrine of trespass ab 
initio is discredited even in the field in which it had its origin. It ap-
plication to misconduct after a privileged arrest is anomolous,and its most 
usual application directly contradictory to one of its fundamental prin-
ciples. The whole tendency of modern tort law is to recognize liability 
only where the defendant has inflicted some harm upon the plaintiff. 
Whatever may have been the case when the doctrine of trespass ab 
initio was first imported into the American decisions in regard to priv-
ileged arrest, there is no longer any tendency to bolster up an inefficient 
criminal admininstration by creating tort actions for the purpose of 
punishing official misconduct by punitive damages. If the misconduct 
of an officer subsequent to a privileged arrest causes actual harm to his 
prisoner, the latter does not need the aid of the ab initio doctrine to ob-
tain redress. It is sufficient to hold, as intimated by the Kansas Supreme 
Court,82 that the misconduct makes the officer's custody of his prisoner 
unhi.wful from the time of its occurrence. Indeed, it may be questioned 
whether the Kansas court has not gone too far in its dictum to this 
effect.83 It may be doubted whether a prisoner, whose detention has 
been prolonged by an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a court 
for hearing, is not sufficiently compensated by permitting him to recover 
for so much of his subsequent detention as is unnecessarily caused by 
the officer's delay. 
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82 A. T. & S. F. R. R. v. Hinsdell, supra note 36. 
sa In the Hinsdell case, the defendant's misconduct consisted in releasing his 
prisoner without bringing him before a proper court. There was, therefore, no 
retention of custody after the misconduct and the court's statement as to the 
effect of the misconduct in making any subsequent detention illegal is, therefore, 
dictum. 
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